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Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act:
An Analysis
By MARY B. NEuMAYR
Member of the Class of 1989
I. INTRODUCION
Since the early Seventies, Congress has continually made greater ef-
forts to halt the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.I These efforts
constitute what is popularly known as the Drug War.2 This war is waged
on all American borders, but most prominently off the coast of Florida.
3
Congress has attempted to fight this massive importation of drugs by
vesting more authority to make arrests and confiscate controlled sub-
stances in, not only local law enforcement officers, but also the United
States Customs Service, the United States Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA), and the United States Coast Guard.4 In 1986, the United
States attempts to deter importation climaxed with Congress introduc-
tion of numerous bills aimed at the growing threat that international
drug trafficking posed to the general welfare of the nation.5 Congres-
sional efforts culminated in the passage of the comprehensive Anti-Drug
Abuse Act.6
One of the most notable sections of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act is the
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.7 The Maritime Drug Law En-
forcement Act specifically relates to extraterritorial jurisdiction on the
high seas and grants the Coast Guard authority to board foreign flagged
1. The current law in this area is the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C
§§ 1901-1903 (1986).
2. Anderson, Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal Under
Domestic and International Law, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM. 323 (1982).
3. Id. at 323 n.l.
4. Id. at 323.
5. INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT Acr, HLR. REP. No. 794, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL ACT OF 1986, H.R. REP. No.
845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L No. 99-570,
§ 3202, 100 Stat. 3207-95 (1986) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903 (1986)).
6. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1986).
7. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903 (1986).
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vessels on the high seag in enumerated circumstances. 8 Although this
section became law without controversy, it represents a very broad grant
of extraterritorial jurisdiction and a noteworthy departure from the tradi-
tional notion of the freedom of the sea.9 This Note will consider the
significant elements of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act by first
discussing both the prior law' 0 and the current, amended law n1 ex-
tending the United States jurisdiction. The Note will then evaluate the
validity of the new statute in light of principles of international and do-
mestic law. In conclusion, the Note will suggest a proper interpretation
of the statute in conformity with these principles.
II. THE MARIJUANA ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT
To fully appreciate the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, one
must consider the laws preceding it. The Coast Guard's boarding of ves-
sels on the high seas was previously governed by the Marijuana on the
High Seas Act (MHSA).' 2 Congress designed the Act to facilitate in-
creased enforcement by the Coast Guard of laws prohibiting the importa-
tion of controlled substances. 3 Controlled substances are defined as
narcotic drugs which, for the purpose of controlling the distribution,
classification, sale or use of drugs, have been designated as such under
federal and state controlled substances acts." The Act declared that it
was unlawful for any person in the customs waters' 5 of the United States,
anyone who is a United States citizen on a vessel on the high seas, anyone
aboard a vessel of the United States, or any person aboard a vessel sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to intentionally or knowingly
manufacture, distribute or possess with the intent to manufacture or dis-
tribute, illicit drugs.' 6 A vessel of the United States under MHSA meant
a vessel documented under United States law, unless it had been afforded
nationality by a foreign nation. 7 A vessel subject to the jurisdiction of
8. Id.
9. Compare id. with S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 25 (Sept.7).
10. Marijuana on the High Seas Act, 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1980).
11. Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1901.1903 (1986).
12. 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1980).
13. Id. Controlled substances are defined as narcotic drugs that, for the purpose of con-
trolling the distribution, classification, sale, or use of drugs, have been designated as such
under federal and state controlled substances acts. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (5th ed.
1979).
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY.
15. Section 955(b) defines customs waters as those defined in 19 U.S.C. § 14010) i.e.,
twelve miles distance from the coast or the distance otherwise agrced to.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 955(a).
17. Id.
[Vol. I11
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
the United States meant a stateless vessel.18 The statute allowed for the
legal importation of controlled substances for scientific, medical or other
legitimate purposes when the carrier was acting in the lawful course of
his duties. 9 The statute also declared that the federal courts were to
have jurisdiction over cases under it and that violations of the Act were
punishable.2"
MHSA was passed in response to the inadequacies of earlier law and
to the growing sophistication of international drug traffickers. The law
preceding MHSA was the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control
Act.2' The 1970 Act was intended to revise the archaic and confusing
laws governing the importation of controlled substances. The 1970 Act
repealed all prior drug laws and consolidated federal law in the area.'
In repealing the prior law criminalizing possession aboard United States
vessels on the high seas, however, the drafters inadvertently failed to en-
act a similar new provision and left a glaring deficiency in the new law. 3
Ironically, the law legalized the possession of controlled substances
aboard United States vessels anywhere beyond the customs waters.24 As
a result, federal prosecutors were only able to convict importers aboard
United States vessels if they could show a conspiracy to import illegal
drugs. 25
At the same time the nature of drug trafficking became more sophis-
ticated. Traffickers began to employ what is now commonly known as
the mothership techniqe.26 Large ships carrying narcotics hover be-
yond customs waters and unload portions of their cargo onto smaller,
swifter delivery boats that can easily outrace the Coast Guard fleets.27
This technique had few risks because even if the cargo was seized, it was
relatively small and of little value compared with the value of the whole
shipment.28 Furthermore, even if traffickers were caught, the likelihood
18. Id. The Act defines a stateless vessel as a vessel without nationality or a vessel assimi-
lated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance with Art. 6, para. 2 of the Convention on
the High Seas. A ship flying under two or more flags is a ship without nationality.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970).
22. Anderson, supra note 2, at 324.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 325; CoAsr GUARD DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT, H.R. REP. No. 323, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979).
27. Anderson, supra note 2, at 325; CoAsT GUARD DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT,
supra note 26, at 3.
28. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 324-25.
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of conviction was slim because of the difficulties of proving a
29conspiracy.
In addition to employing the mothership technique, foreign traffick-
ers frequently used "stateless" vessels.30 Since the 1970 Act did not
cover stateless vessels, this practice also became a successful technique
for evading jurisdiction.31
Congress drafted MHSA to correct the glaring deficiencies of the
1970 Act and to combat the innovative methods used by professional
traffickers to evade jurisdiction. With the passage of MHSA, Congress
achieved its aim of enhanced enforcement. However although Congress
cautiously drafted MHSA, controversy surrounded itg passage and nu-
merous suits challenged its legality.32
The controversy centered around the provision extending the juris-
diction of the United States to include stateless vessels.33 A number of
courts discussed whether this provision violated international law by of-
fending the long established doctrine of the freedom of the sea.3" One
significant factor in their consideration was the legislative history of
MHSA indicating Congress intent to abide by international law when
applying the drug enforcement laws extraterritorially. 35 Taking this into
account, courts ultimately concluded that the law is within the bounda-
ries of international law. The courts reasoned that MHSA complied with
the general notion that stateless vessels have no claim to the rights and
privileges granted by international law,36 and that the extension of juris-
diction over stateless vessels on the high seas did not violate international
law because international law protects only members of the international
29. Id.
30. Id. at 325.
31. Id.
32. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (1lth Cir. 1982); United States v,
Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340
(S.D. Fla. 1981); United States v. Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) (1980) which defines "vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" to include stateless vessels.
34. Anderson, supra note 2, at 325 n. 11 and accompanying text. See e.g., United States v,
Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979); Angola, 514 F. Supp. at 935; United States v. May
May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
35. Robinson, 515 F. Supp. at 1343.
36. Anderson, supra note 2, at 334, citing Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, 1979-
Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Comm, on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 54-56 (1979)(statement of Morris D.
Busby, Director, Office of Ocean Affairs, OES Bureau, Department of State). Cortes, 588 F,
Supp. at 110.
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comimumnty, 3 7 to which stateless vessels do not belong.38
In arriving at the conclusion that international law does not protect
stateless vessels and that jurisdiction over such vessels should be upheld
m MHSA proceedings, the courts relied on the Convention on the High
Seas. Under the Convention, stateless vessels have no relationship to a
sovereign 39 and are not entitled to invoke the freedom of the sea doc-
trme. ° The stateless vessel is viewed as not accepting obligations ordi-
narily imposed when a ship registers with a foreign state, and therefore
not entitled to the corresponding protection.4' In addition, the courts
relied on the strong international policy promoting the registration of
vessels to ensure orderliness on the oceans and favoring any incentives to
accomplish this.42 Finally, the courts recognized that international prac-
tice permits the extension of jurisdiction to activities whose nature
threatens the security of a state.4 3 For these reasons courts approved the
extension of jurisdiction found m MHSA.
I. TLE MARITIME DRUG LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACT
The current statute amending the Marijuana on the High Seas Act is
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act. The amended statute essen-
tially mirrors MHSA. For instance, the amended statute makes it un-
lawful for any person on board a United States vessel, or a vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the Umted States, or any United States citizen, or
any person within the customs waters of the United States, to knowingly
or intentionally manufacture, distribute or possess with intent to dis-
tribute, a controlled substance.44 The statute exempts contract carers
37. Cones, 588 F Supp. at 110; United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 49, cert denied, 457
U.S. 1135 (1982); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 258 (1st Cir. 1982).
38. Cores, 588 F.Supp. at 110; Green, 671 F.2d at 49; Smith, 680 F.2d at 258.
39. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, Art. 6, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 450 U.N.T. 82 [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].
40. Note, International Law-Criminal Law-Federal Jurisdiction-21 U.S C § 955a Gives
the Federal Government Criminal Jurisdiction Over All Stateless Vessels on the High Seas En-
gaged in the Distribution of Controlled Substances, 52 U. ClN. L REv. 292, 305 n.113 (1983)
(noting that sovereigns are the primary beneficiaries of the freedom of the sea doctrine and
only through them may individual citizens have access to it); Anderson, supra note 2, at 329-
30 (noting that in general international law violations must be raised by nations on behalf of
their citizens).
41. United States v. Angola, 514 F Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
42. Note, supra note 40, at 309.
43. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967). This is the protective
principle ofjunsdiction. See infra text accompanying note 85 and notes 104-08.
44. 46 U.S.C. § 1901(a),(b),(c). This section falls under the chapter entitled Drug Abuse
Prevention on Board Vessels.
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and employees possessing or distributing a controlled substance in the
lawful course of their duties,4" and provides for federal jurisdiction and
penalties46 for violations of the statute.47 It also states explicitly its in-
tended extraterritorial effect.48 Additionally, the statute clearly states the
underlying premise upon which it presupposes its validity: "The Con-
gress finds and declares that trafficking in controlled substances aboard
vessels is a serious international problem and is universally condemned.
Moreover, such trafficking presents a specific threat to the security and
societal well-being of the United States."49 The statute goes on to pro-
vide for interdiction procedures for the boarding of foreign vessels, ad-
mitting that it may be difficult when the vessel is on the high seas, but
that consent must be obtained from the master of the vessel or from the
country of registry.50
Although the Act almost identically sets forth what was contained
in MHSA, in section 1903 there are two significant expansions of juris-
diction. First, section 1903(c)(1)(C) expands the definition of a vessel
"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to include not only
stateless, domestic, and foreign vessels within the customs waters of the
United States, but also vessels of foreign registry on the high seas when
the flag state consents or waives objection to enforcement jurisdiction.',
Consent or waiver by a foreign nation may be obtained by a telephone
call, radio conversation or similar oral or electronic means.5 Notably,
prior to section 1903(c)(1)(C), possession by foreign nationals on board
foreign vessels on the high seas was not a violation of United States law.
It was possible, however, for the United States to make a prior arrange-
ment with a foreign nation to board vessels, or upon sighting a suspicious
vessel on the high seas, to obtain the immediate consent of the foreign
nation of the vessel to board. 3 In the past jurisdiction was also extended
beyond the customs waters,54 but this extension was limited to a specific
distance off the coast and was not extended to the high seas generally.55
45. Id. at (e).
46. Id. at (f).
47. Id. at (g).
48. Id. at (h).
49. 46 U.S.C. § 1902.
50. Id. The Secretary of State is asked to assist in obtaining consent from the nation, or
purported nation, of registry.
51. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(C) (1986).
52. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(E) (1986).
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1980).
54. Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 (1982) [hereinafter Anti-Smug-
gling Act].
55. Id.
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Nevertheless, as will be shown this expanded meaning of a "vessel within
the jurisdiction of the United States" falls within the established princi-
ples of American and international law. 6
A second provision of section 1903 expands the traditional concept
of jurisdiction significantly. The provision states: "A claim of failure to
comply with international law in the enforcement of this Act may be
invoked solely by a foreign nation, and a failure to comply with interna-
tional law shall not divest a court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a
defense to any proceeding under this Act."'57 This novel and ambiguous
provision will be scrutinized carefully because its interpretation under
certain circumstances will be crucial in a proceeding under this Act.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1903(c)(1)(C)
In examining section 1903(c)(1)(C) one must first examine princi-
ples of American law to evaluate the expansion of the meaning of "ves-
sels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Initially one must
look to the United States Constitution for Congressional authority to
prescribe such a law. The Constitution clearly grants Congress the
power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
seas" and offenses against the Law of Nations.5 8 Furthermore, American
jurists have long recognized the right of the United States to prohibit
conduct and extend jurisdiction over offenses committed on the high seas
when they cause an effect in the United States. 9 The high seas, which lie
beyond the internal waters' and the customs or territorial waters, 6' have
fallen under United States jurisdiction in the past; foreign vessels, too,
have been historically subject to United States jurisdiction.
56. See infra notes 58-134 and accompanying text.
57. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d) (1986).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
59. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 300-01 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965)[hereinafter RFSTrTEMENT];
United States v. The Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). The Supreme Court referred to
the Act of 1790 and noted "as to the right of the United States to punish all ofrenses committed
on or from on board their own vessels, it cannot be doubted that the Act of 1790 extends to
such offenses when committed on the high seas." Pirates, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 194.
60. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22 (1969); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
862, 869 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). Internal waters ordinarily extend
approximately three miles.
61. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 22; Postal, 589 F.2d at 869 (citing Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.LA.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205. The coastal state may exercise substantial control over this area but may not
deny a nation the right of innocent passage).
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
A. Evolution of Jurisdiction in the United States
The United States first asserted jurisdiction over foreign vessels on
the high seas in 1790 when Congress passed An Act to Provide More
Effectually for the Collection of Duties. The purpose of this Act was to
enhance revenue collection.62 The 1790 Act was specifically aimed at
preventing the unloading of cargo beyond the customs waters without
payment of duties. Justice Marshall wrote of the Act:
The authority of a nation, within our own nation is absolute and exclu-
sive ... but its power to assure itself from injury may certainly be
exercised beyond the limits of its territory. Upon this principle, the
right of a belligerent to search a neutral vessel on the high seas, for
contraband, is universally admitted... so too, a nation has a right to
prohibit commerce with its colonies. 63
Justice Story stated that the Act applies equally to all vessels, and indeed
more strongly to foreign vessels, since frauds committed by them in eva-
sion of the revenue laws are less easily detected.6
In 1935 Congress again asserted jurisdiction over foreign flagged
vessels on the high seas by passing the Anti-Smuggling Act. This Act,
intended to quell the importation of liquor to the United States, 65 author-
ized customs officers to board any vessel within a sixty-two mile limit and
to enforce the statute.66 It, like the current provisions found in section
1903(c)(1)(C), extended jurisdiction beyond the customs waters to vessels
hovering off the coast with illicit cargos.67
The United States adoption of legislation extending jurisdiction, evi-
denced by these and similar acts, reaches far back into American history.
This type of legislation has been limited in scope, and traditionally con-
fined to measures that are reasonably necessary and neither harassing nor
vexatious.68
In addition the practice of granting the Coast Guard legal authority
to board foreign vessels on the seas can be traced back almost two hun-
dred years to when Congress created the Coast Guard in 1790, as the
"Revenue Cutter Service," 69 and granted it the authority to board,
62. Postal, 589 F.2d at 879 (citing An Act to Provide More Effectually for the Collection
of Duties, ch.35, 1 Stat. 145 (1790) [hereinafter 1790 Act]).
63. Id. (citing Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804)).
64. Id. (citing The Betsy, 3 F. Cas. 303, 304 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1365)).
65. Anti-Smuggling Act, supra note 54; Postal, 589 F.2d at 880.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804); Postal, 589 F.2d at 879.
69. Postal, 589 F.2d at 879 n.26 (citing ch.35 § 62, 1 Stat. 175 (1790)).
[Vol. I11
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search, and examine all vessels in the customs waters.70 Today, existing
legislation allows the Coast Guard to make inquiries, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and the customs waters
under certain circumstances when the United States has jurisdiction.7 1
The statute is not, on its face, limited to domestic vessels or domestic
waters.72 Section 1903(c)(1)(C)'s grant of authority, supported by ex-
isting statutes, 3 simply aids the Coast Guard in carrying out the func-
tions of maritime law enforcement, for which it was created.74
Thus, American principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction found in
the Constitution, prior legislation, and practice appear to permit the ex-
tension of jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas to meet
threats posed by cargo vessels lurking beyond the customs waters. Like
the 1790 Act and the Anti-Smuggling Act, which were upheld in United
States courts as valid extensions of jurisdiction, the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act may be upheld as a reasonable and necessary measure
intended to prevent foreign vessels hovering off the United States coasts
from unloading illegal cargo and evading jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdiction under International Law
In evaluating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, principles
of international law should be consulted since, to the extent that they do
not conflict with United States law, they become part of United States
law.75 One of the most important distinctions required by international
law when a local law is exercised extraterritorially is the distinction be-
tween legislative jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.7 6 Legislative
jurisdiction is jurisdiction to prescribe a law, while enforcement jurisdic-
tion is jurisdiction to enforce a law.7 Under international law there is no
jurisdiction to enforce unless there is jurisdiction to prescribe. The con-
verse, however, is not always true, since even when there is jurisdiction to
70. Id. at § 64.
71. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982)(enacted Aug. 4, 1949); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d
1252, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d
1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Section 89(a) was necessary because 18 U.S.C. § 7
(1982)(enacted June 25, 1948) granted the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States to the high seas, but not to foreign vessels.
72. Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1257 (discussing 14 U.S.C. § 89(a)).
73. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).
74. CoAsT GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION AND LAw ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1986, H.R.
REP. No. 973, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
75. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
76. United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257 (1st Cir. 1982).
77. Id.
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prescribe there is not automatically jurisdiction to enforce.78
The classic Lotus case79 illustrates this important distinction be-
tween legislative and enforcement jurisdiction well. In the Lotus case a
Turkish vessel and a French vessel collided on the high seas and eight
Turkish sailors drowned. When the master of the French vessel volunta-
rily set foot on Turkish shores, the Turkish state immediately arrested
him and instituted criminal proceedings against him. He was eventually
convicted of manslaughter on the high seas.80 The international tribunal
held that Turkey was free to prescribe a law criminalizing such activities
on the high seas. Turkey, then, had legislative jurisdiction.81 The Court
did not hold, however, that Turkey could enforce that law by making an
arrest on the high seas. Indeed, Turkey had no enforcement jurisdiction
and it was only owing to the French sea captain's entry into Turkey that
the Turkish government had jurisdiction to make the arrest.8 2
Similarly, in analyzing section 1903(c)(1)(C) it is necessary to deter-
mine not only whether there is jurisdiction to prescribe the law criminal-
izing possession, but also whether there is jurisdiction to enforce the law
by making arrests on the high seas. In the Lotus case the freedom of the
sea doctrine prevented enforcement jurisdiction. 3 Whether the freedom
of the sea doctrine will bar enforcement of the Maritime Drug Law En-
forcement Act must be considered next.
i. Jurisdiction to Prescribe
International law recognizes five basic principles which may be used
by a sovereign to justify the criminalizing of an act that takes place
outside the sovereign's own state. Originally announced in Rivard v.
United States,84 these principles are: (1) the passive personality princi-
ple, (2) the nationality principle, (3) the universality principle, (4) the
territoriality principle, and (5) the protective principle.85 These princi-
ples permit states to apply their laws extraterritorially to individuals who
78. Id.
79. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10 (Sept.7).
80. Id.
81. Id. Note that Article 11 of the Convention on the High Seas overrules Lotus on this
point of the penal responsibility of the master of the vessel. Convention on the High Seas,
supra note 39, at Art. 11.
82. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10. There was no enforcement jurisdiction over the
French sea captain on the high seas. Under the freedom of the sea doctrine, France as the flag
state had exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel while it was on the high seas. By entering the
Turkish territory, however, the French captain submitted to Turkey's laws. Id. at 70.
83. Id.
84. 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).
85. Id. at 885.
[Vol. I11
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
would otherwise be outside their jurisdiction.86
The passive personality principle provides a basis for jurisdiction
when the victim of the crime is of the state's own nationality. 7 This
principle is premised on the view that extraterritorial criminal acts of a
foreign national affect a state's own citizens, and thus, a state has a vested
interest in punishing the perpetrator of the crime.88 Currently, however,
the United States does not recognize this as a valid basis of jurisdiction. 9
No domestic court, consequently, has turned to this principle as a basis
for extending United States jurisdiction to the high seas.90
The nationality principle provides a basis for jurisdiction when the
criminal offender is a citizen of the state.9 While a state cannot arrest
one of its own citizens in the territory of another state, it is a long estab-
lished practice that a state may arrest one of its own citizens on the high
seas or in localities not within the jurisdiction of all nations.92 Since sec-
tion 1903(c)(1)(C) deals with foreign nationals on the high seas, the na-
tionality principle is not relevant to an examination of the new statute's
validity under international law.
The universality principle provides a basis for jurisdiction when the
offender is within the custody of the state93 i.e., when the offender is in
the state's port. The underlying rationale of this principle is that the port
state is in a better position to enforce the criminal laws and should be
given the authority under international law to do so.94 The universality
principle has come to mean that there are universally condemned crimes
that are punishable if the state has custody of the offender.9"
Crimes which are usually punishable under this principle and over
which extraterritorial jurisdiction legitimately extends are extremely hei-
nous ones, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In 1936, an attempt
to bring drug trafficking within the realm of universally condemned
crimes failed.9 6 Consequently, legislators and domestic courts have not
86. Id. This is because such individuals are outside of the state's borders, foreign nation-
als or aliens merely present within the state.
87. Rivard, 375 F.2d at 885 n.9; Clark, Criminal Jurisdiction over Merchant ,essels En-
gaged in International Trade, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM. 219, 221 (1980); Note, supra note 40, at
298 n.53.
88. Clark, supra note 87, at 221; RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 30(2).
89. Note, supra note 40, at 298 n.53; RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 30(2).
90. See Note, supra note 40, at 298 n.53.
91. Id. at 298 n.49; Clark, supra note 87, at 220.
92. Clark, supra note 87, at 221.
93. Id. at 220-21; Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967).
94. See Clark, supra note 87, at 220, 222.
95. Id. at 222.
96. Note, supra note 40, at 298 n.52.
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invoked the universality principle to justify extending the jurisdiction on
the high seas to trafficking situations. 97
The territoriality principle provides a basis for jurisdiction when
criminal acts occur within the state, or when criminal acts occurring
outside the state produce effects within the state.98 This principle corre-
sponds to the traditional common law view that "all criminal jurisdiction
is inherently territorial." '99 Thus, a foreign national may be prosecuted in
the territory' either where he commits the crime or where his crime
causes an effect. 10 This theory looks to objective effects within the sov-
ereign state and justifies the enactment of laws condemning criminal ac-
tivities.101 Domestic courts in the United States have frequently invoked
this principle to uphold the validity of drug trafficking laws affecting for-
eign nationals on the high seas,102 since massive narcotics importations
unquestionably produce significant effects within the United States.0 3
The protective principle justifies the enactment of laws over foreign
nationals perpetrating extraterritorial criminal acts that either threaten a
nation's security or interfere with a government's proper functioning.t14
For example, immigration, currency, and mail fraud offenses committed
abroad threaten a nation's security or interfere with its functioning. 10 5
The rationale behind the protective principle is that these offenses affront
the sovereignty of the enacting nation. 06 The enacting nations therefore
have the right to protect themselves'0 7 and frequently do invoke this
principle to assume jurisdiction.0 8 Legislatures often use the protective
principle to justify enacting laws that extend jurisdiction in drug traffick-
97. See Id.
98. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967); Clark, supra note 87, at
220-21; Note, supra note 40, at 298 n.51.
99. Clark, supra note 87, at 221.
100. Id.; United States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1979),
101. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v,
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States V.
Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
William, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
102. Postal, 589 F.2d at 885; Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1257.
103. Postal, 589 F,2d at 885; Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1257.
104. Clark, supra note 87, at 221-22; Note, supra note 40, at 298 n.50.
105. Clark, supra note 87, at 222.
106. Clark, supra note 87, at 221-22; United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir,
1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); United States v. Columba-Colela, 604 F.2d 356, 358
(5th Cir. 1979); Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35 (1804).
107. See Clark, supra note 87, at 222; Pizzzrusso, 388 F.2d at 10; Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 234-35.
108. Clark, supra note 87, at 221-22; Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10; Columba.Colela, 604 F.2d
at 358; Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 234-35.
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ing cases.' 0 9
The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act is supported by both the
protective and territorial principles. The Act refers to international drug
trafficking as a "specific threat to the security and societal well-being of
the United States,"' 1 0 reflecting the view of Dante Fascell, Chairman of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, that drug importation is "not only a
tragic national menace but a threat to our domestic peace and secur-
ity.""' This provision of the Act indicates that the protective principle
would support its enactment. The statute also implies that the importa-
tion of drugs both poses a serious international problem and creates sig-
nificant effects in the United States. 1 2 Therefore the territorial principle
would further support its enactment.'
3
In summary then the millions of pounds of narcotics, worth billions
of dollars, which enter the United States annually' 14 gave the United
States under either the protective or territorial theory, the jurisdiction to
prescribe a law criminalizing narcotics manufacture, distribution, and
possession with intent to manufacture or distribute, regardless of
whether or not the offenders are foreign nationals. A court may find
legislative jurisdiction to enact the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
is consistent with the analogous and seminal Lotus case. The court in
Lotus permitted the extension of legislative jurisdiction over foreign na-
tionals on the high seas on the principle that a sovereign is entitled to
protect its own citizens from criminal activity." 5
ii. Jurisdiction to Enforce
The more controversial question raised by section 1903(c)(1)(C) is
whether the United States is entitled under the principles of international
law to stray from Lotus and to authorize enforcement of the statute, spe-
cifically, whether the Coast Guard may properly be authorized to board
foreign flagged vessels on the high seas in order to make arrests and
seizures and to otherwise enforce the provisions of the law. The interna-
tional principle embodied in the Convention on the High Seas in Article
109. Clark, supra note 87, at 221-22; Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10; Columba-Colela, 604 F.2d
at 358; Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 234-35.
110. 46 U.S.C. § 1902 (1986).
111. H.R. RaP. No. 798, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt1, at 1 (1986).
112. 46 U.S.C. § 1902; Note, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21:
Overextension of the Protective Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L REV.
688, 688 n.1 (1982).
113. See Note, supra note 112, at 688 n.1.
114. Id.
115. The Lotus Case, 4 P.C.I.J ANN. R. (ser. E) No.4, at 171-73 (1927-1928).
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6 provides: "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties 1 6 or in
these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high
seas." 7 Thus under Article 6, no state has jurisdiction over a foreign
vessel on the high seas unless the articles or an international agreement
so provides.' 8
Section 1903(c)(1)(C) is by definition self-confining and within its
limits does not offend Article 6's general notion of exclusive jurisdiction
by the flag state." 9 Section 1903(c)(1)(C) limits enforcement jurisdiction
to those situations in which the flag state has entered into an interna-
tional agreement with the United States, either by pre-arrangement or by
oral communications, at the time the Coast Guard attempts to board the
vessel. 120 Under Article 6 international agreements need not be for-
mal'21 and have frequently been upheld despite a lack of formality.' 22 In
fact, the Coast Guard carried out section 1903(c)(1)(C) boardings long
before the statute's enactment in 1986.123 It is the regular practice of the
Coast Guard, when sighting a suspicious foreign vessel within the cus-
toms waters, to seek permission first from the captain, and then from the
state if necessary, to board the vessel.' 24 This practice does not violate
Article 6's general denial of jurisdiction to nonflag nations to board, ex-
cept in limited circumstances, 25 since Article 6 defines one of those cir-
cumstances to be an international agreement. The international
agreement provision in Article 6 encompasses section 1903(c)(1)(C)'s
"consent or waiver of objection to enforcement jurisdiction by the United
States."
116. Statement of Stephan A. Riesenfeld, Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law
(Aug. 28, 1987). When discussing Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, Professor
Riesenfeld said that "treaties" within'the meaning of the Convention can be very informal, As
long as they are agreements, eg., phone calls or oral communications between those with
authority, they will be upheld.
117. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 39, at para. 1.
118. Id.
119. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1)(C) (1986) enumerates the specific circumstances under which
jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas exists.
120. Although this is not explicit in the statute, these are inevitably the two alternatives.
121. See Riesenfeld, supra note 116.
122. Id.
123. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982)(amended Aug. 3, 1950), empowering the Coast Guard to
board foreign vessels after making inquiries.
124. United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 49 (Ist Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135
(1982); United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414, 417 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v, May May,
470 F. Supp. 384, 388 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
125. Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas lists these limited circumstances as
either exceptional circumstances specified in international treaties or circumstances provided
for in the Convention articles. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 39, at Art. 6.
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United States v. Green 126 illustrates how the Coast Guard boardings
of foreign vessels on the high seas, when the flag nation consents, are
consistent with Article 6 boardings under an international agreement. In
Green the Coast Guard encountered a suspicious British vessel fifty-five
miles off the coast of New England. The vessel was moving sluggishly
and appeared to be carrying a heavy load." 7 The captain of the British
vessel, in response to the Coast Guard's request, refused to consent to
boarding by Coast Guard officers. 28 The State Department, pursuant to
its statutory responsibility, 129 sought permission from the British govern-
ment to board the vessel. 3 British authorities granted permission.
When the Coast Guard boarded the vessel, they discovered and seized a
large quantity of marijuana.'
The court in Green held that the consent of the British government
vitiated any violation of the exclusive sovereignty provision of the Con-
vention on the High Seas (Article 6).132 The British government, the
court said, waived the rights of the individuals to raise the issue of the
boarding as a treaty violation.' 33 The court held that there was no viola-
tion because the policy underlying Article 6 is merely intended to prevent
arbitrary interference by one state with the vessels of another. By per-
mitting the boarding by law enforcement officers when the flag state con-
sents, the United States actually promotes the policy underlying Article
6,1" by recognizing the flag nation's ability to exercise authority over its
vessels.'35 In spite of appearing on its face to be an overbroad grant of
jurisdiction, section 1903(c)(1)(C) fals within the established principles
of domestic and international law since it allows only a limited extension
of jurisdiction to foreign vessels on the high seas.
126. 671 F.2d 46 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
127. Id. at 48.
128. Id, at 49.
129. Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, title II, § 2015, 100 Stat. 3207-68. This
session law governs interdiction procedures for vessels of foreign registry and directs the Secre-
tary of State to act as an intermediary between the Coast Guard and the State where the vessel
purports to be registered.
130. Green, 671 F.2d at 49. Permission was sought through the American Embassy in
London.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 49-50.
133. Id. at 50.
134. Ruf, Coast Guard Searches of Foreign Flag Vessels, 14 LAv. OF THE AM. 355, 357
(1982).
135. Id. at 357.
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V. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1903(d)
Section 1903(d) does not enjoy the same validity as section
1903(c)(1)(C). This section states that only a foreign nation, and not an
individual, may claim that international law has been violatbd.' 36 Fur-
thermore, a finding of failure to comply with international law shall not
divest the court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a defense. 137 It is
difficult not to conclude that this section is self-contradictory. On the
other hand, it does reflect several doctrines of international law recog-
nized by domestic courts.
Section 1903(d)'s first clause states that foreign states and not indi-
viduals must raise international law violations. 138 This echoes the famil-
iar concept in international law that the rights and immunities granted
by international law are given to nations, and only reach citizens through
their nations. 139 Thus, in most cases, 140 individuals are barred from rais-
ing international law violations as a defense to their prosecution. 141 The
rationale for this exclusion is that the wrong committed violates interna-
tional but not domestic law and consequently1 42 only nations, not indi-
viduals, are competent to raise violations of international law. 143 The
clause's requirement that the sovereign raise such violations is thus in
conformity with international law.
The second clause of 1903(d), however, does not conform to interna-
tional law. It states that international law violations will not deprive the
court of jurisdiction or constitute a defense in a Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act prosecution. 144 This clause echoes the Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine recognized by American courts which prevents a defendant
from arguing that his presence was secured in violation of either interna-
tional or domestic law. 45 Nevertheless, even under the Ker-Frisbie Doc-
trine, there are some situations, (likely to arise in a Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Proceeding) in which foreign nationals are individually per-
136. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d) (1986).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Anderson, supra note 2, at 329.
140. Id. Diplomatic immunities or human rights cases are the exception to the general rule
that international law violations may not be raised. P. JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS,
at 17-18 (1948).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 46 U.S.C. § 1903(d).
145. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443-44 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1952); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane).
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mitted to raise international law violations." 6
The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine evolved from the decision in Ker v. Illi-
nois. 4 7 In Ker a defendant accused of larceny fled to Peru. Although
the necessary papers concerning his extradition existed, he was forcibly
and violently returned to the United States. 148 The defendant claimed
that the court lacked jurisdiction over him because his extradition had
violated the terms of a treaty between the United States and Peru, 149 and
that his seizure and forcible transportation from Peru amounted to kid-
napping.150 The court held that although Ker might have some redress
and could seek some remedy for his unauthorized seizure elsewhere, for-
cible abduction was not a sufficient reason to deprive the court of juris-
diction and presented no valid objection to his trial. 15 1 The court thus
held that Ker had no right under the treaty to claim a violation." 2
Similarly, in Frisbie v. Collins 153 a defendant accused of a Michigan
murder was forcibly brought from Illinois to Michigan. He appealed his
conviction on the grounds that it was invalid because he had been forci-
bly abducted. 154 His efforts, however, were also unsuccessful and the
court held: "There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to
permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he
was brought to trial against his will."'155
In the realm of international law, domestic courts have widely ac-
cepted the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine.156 At the same time, however, courts
have been at liberty to enforce Article 22 of the Convention on the High
Seas, which gives parties a right to compensation for damages suffered as
a consequence of international law violations which occur when foreign
flagged vessels on the high seas are unjustly boarded. 5 7 Courts have
adhered to the view that violations should be compensated, but such vio-
146. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
147. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-38.
148. Id. at 438.
149. Id. at 439.
150. Id. at 438.
151. Id. at 444.
152. Id. at 443.
153. 342 U.S. 519, 520 (1952).
154. Id. at 520.
155. Id. at 522.
156. See United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane); United
States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 398-99 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
157. Article 22(3) states: "If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the
ship boarded has not committed an act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or
damage that may have been sustained." Convention on the High Seas, supra note 39, at 22(3).
See generally supra text accompanying note 117.
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lations should not clothe the defendant with immunity from criminal
prosecution. 158
Courts have also held, however, that there is an exception to the
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine when a self-executing treaty, requiring no imple-
menting legislation to take effect, 159 is involved."6° Thus, if the boarding
is made in clear violation of a self-executing treaty limiting the right of
the United States to board the vessel of the sovereign nation with whom
the treaty is made, domestic courts will give effect to the treaty and re-
frain from applying the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine.1 61 The underlying princi-
ple is that in making the agreement with a foreign nation, the United
States imposes a territorial limitation on itself and agrees to board the
foreign vessels only in compliance with certain conditions. 62
Since Cook v. United States163 is the leading case advocating this
exception, this is often called the Cook Exception. 1 64 In Cook the United
States made an agreement with England concerning the seizure of British
vessels suspected of smuggling intoxicating liquor into the United States
during Prohibition.1 65 The treaty provided that the :British vessels might
be seized off the coast anywhere within a distance that could be traversed
within one hour. 166 When a vessel was seized in the United States cus-
toms waters but beyond the one hour's sailing distance, the defendants
argued that the United States violated the treaty.1 67 The court chose not
to apply the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine because it considered the treaty to be
self-executing. 168 The court chose to permit these treaty violations to be
argued because the British position in making the treaty was that Britain
would not tolerate interference with British vessels beyond that author-
ized by the treaty. 169 Thus treaty violations could be raised by the
defendant. 170
158. May May, 470 F.Supp. at 398-99; Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1261
159. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933).
160. Cook, 288 U.S. at 119; United States v. Postal, 5"89 F.2d 862, 873-75 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
161. Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22; Postal, 585 F.2d at 875-76.
162. Cook, 228 U.S. at 121-22; Postal, 585 F.2d at 874-75.
163. 288 U.S. 102.
164. See Postal, 589 F.2d at 875.
165. Id. at 874 n.18 and 882 n.33 (citing the Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of
Intoxicating Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924, United States-Great Britain, 43 Stat. 1761-63, T.S. 685),
166. Postal, 589 F.2d at 874 n.18
167. Cook, 288 U.S. at 109-10.
168. Id. at 118-19, 121; Postal, 589 F.2d at 874-75.
169. Cook, 288 U.S. atl 15-18; Postal, 589 F.2d at 883.
170. Postal, 589 F.2d at 873-75. In Postal the self-executing nature of Article 6 of the
Convention on the High Seas was in controversy. Id. at 876. Article 6 was held by the Postal
court to be non-self-executing. Id. at 884. However, this conclusion is doubtful. See e.g.,
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VI. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1903
To be enforceable, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act should
be properly interpreted to meet the guidelines and principles set down by
both domestic and international law. International law is important be-
cause, as the Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States states: "If a domestic law of the United States may be interpreted
either in a manner consistent with international law or in a manner that
is in conflict with international law, a court in the United States will
interpret it in a manner that is consistent with international law."' 71
As discussed above, the extension of jurisdiction in section
1903(c)(1)(C) is proper under both American and international law and
should be upheld by the court. The denial in section 1903(d) of the right
of nations to raise violations of international law, however, should not be
upheld. Rather, Cook should be followed. In upholding the extension of
jurisdiction the courts, to remain consistent with both United States and
international law, must also observe the limitations that international law
traditionally places on nations applying their own laws extraterritori-
ally.172 Essentially, to justify boarding foreign flagged vessels under the
Act, there must be suspicious circumstances which warrant the boarding
for a specific, authorized purpose, namely to enforce the laws of the
United States prohibiting drug trafficking on the high seas. In accord-
ance with the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, there
must be a reasonable and articulable basis for suspecting that the impor-
tation is directed towards the United States. 173 Alternatively, the impor-
tation must pose a real threat to American security174 and interfere with
the carrying out of United States customs laws concerning drug traffick-
ing.175 The following examples provide a sense of the proper grounds
warranting searches and inspections by the Coast Guard aboard foreign
flagged vessels on the high seas.
In United States v. Green, 176 the sloop suspected of carrying narcot-
ics was only fifty-five miles off the coast, was moving slowly, and ap-
peared lower in the bow than normal. The sloop did not answer the
Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S x Postal. Win At Any Price?, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1980); Connolly, "Smoke on the Water": Coast Guard Authority to
Seize Foreign Vessels Beyond the Contiguous Zone, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & PoL. 249 (1980).
171. RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 3(3).
172. United States v. Newball, 524 F.Supp. 715, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
173. See United States. v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
174. United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
175. Id. at 1345.
176. 671 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982). See supra notes 126-
133 and accompanying text.
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Coast Guard's attempts to contact it by radio until approximately two
hours had elapsed. In addition, the sloop was also on the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency's list of vessels suspected of illegal activities. 177
In United States v. Cortes178 the vessel had no permanently affixed
name, flew no flag, and those aboard the vessel claimed that the com-
mander had gone ashore because of engine trouble. The nearest land,
however, was twenty-six miles away. Furthermore, when the Coast
Guard did go on board they noticed that there was no main beam
number identifying the vessel and that the ship smelled of marijuana. 179
Under such conditions, the Coast Guard's behavior in searching the ves-
sel further was fully justified.
In United States v. Cadena 180 the vessel was two hundred miles off
the Florida coast. When the Coast Guard hailed the vessel, the vessel's
only English speaking man aboard, the captain, shouted a pre-arranged
signal indicating the presence of law enforcement officers in the vicinity.
The vessel ignored the Coast Guard's signals and continued to sail away.
Furthermore, the freighter sailed without lights or a flag, and during the
chase its crew members threw packages overboard.' 1
United States v. Newball 82 stands as a final example of a warranted
Coast Guard boarding. In that case the Coast Guard trailed a fishing
vessel for a day and observed members of the crew spread liquid about
the vessel, board a small launch, and set the vessel on fire. The Coast
Guard then properly boarded the vessel, put out the fire, seized the
cargo, and arrested the crew. 83
In contrast, United States v. James-Robinson I" stands as an exam-
ple of an improper boarding by the Coast Guard. There the boarding
was improper because the vessel was four hundred miles off the coast of
the United States. The Court held that there was no indirect evidence-
such as location and direction in which the ship was sailing, size of the
shipment, documents or inscriptions found on the vessel, or other rele-
vant evidence-to suggest that it was sailing for the United States. 8 , In
United States v. Angola, the court also dictated caution in boarding ves-
sels too far off the coast, citing as an illustration a vessel "half way
177. Green, 671 F.2d at 48.
178. 588 F.2d 106, 106 (5th Cir. 1979).
179. Id. at 108.
180. 585 F.2d 1252, 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
181. Id. at 1256.
182. 524 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
183. Id. at 718.
184. 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
185. Id. at 1347.
[Vol. I11
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
around the world in the Gulf of Siam."18 6
Hence, courts should consider practical matters surrounding the
boarding of the vessel in applying the statute and determining whether or
not a boarding is justified. When the Coast Guard boards foreign flagged
vessels on the high seas pursuant to the Maritime Drug Law Enforce-
ment Act, it should comply with the past practices illustrated in the
above cases. Domestic courts should attempt to ensure that the board-
ings do not become random and arbitrary, disturbing the orderly passage
of vessels on the high seas.
VII. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE MARITIME DRUG
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT
Proceedings under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act
should be similar to those in Cook. The agreements under the Act are
between two nations and are self-executing, since it is neither necessary
nor intended that the United States pass legislation giving American law
enforcement personnel permission to board foreign vessels. In addition,
foreign states do not intend to make an unlimited waiver of objection to
United States enforcement on the high seas of United States drug traf-
ficking laws. Rather, they intend to make only a limited waiver of their
exclusive sovereignty over their own vessels. Their understanding of that
agreement should be honored, just as it was in Cook.
For the above reasons, the section 1903(d) provision prohibiting a
defendant from raising international law violations under treaties or less
formal international agreements cannot be supported by recognized prin-
ciples governing the raising of such violations in domestic courts. Sec-
tion 1903(d) conflicts with the Cook Exception that takes into account
the importance of giving treaties force even when it means dismissing a
suit over which the court would ordinarily have jurisdiction. In the in-
terests of adherence to the principle nulla poena sine lege (no punish-
ment without law), a defendant should be allowed to argue violations of
treaties. It is the treaty itself that defines whether the vessel is "within
the jurisdiction of the United States." If a vessel does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the United States because the conditions of the applicable
treaty are not met, it is only just that this essential fact may be argued
and that the party aboard the foreign vessel be allowed to raise it.
186. 514 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In the Lotus case the Court held: "Vessels on the high seas are sub-
ject to no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly. In virtue
of the principle of the freedom of the seas, that is to say, the absence of
any territorial sovereignty upon the high seas, no State may exercise any
kind of jurisdiction over vessels upon them." 187 The Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act stands in contrast to the notion embodied in the
Lotus Court's statement because it extends the jurisdiction of the United
States to certain foreign flagged vessels on the high seas. The extension
of jurisdiction under the terms of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act, nevertheless, stands up to the tests of constitutionality and to the
standards established by international law. Consequently, the extension
in the statute is valid. The provision of the statute governing the raising
of international law violations, however, does not meet the established
standards of international law set down in this area and recognized by
American courts. The courts should invalidate this provision since it
could lead to injustices in its application by preventing the raising of le-
gitimate defenses. Upholding the extension of jurisdiction but striking
down the provision violating the Cook Exception will pave the way to
enhanced but proper and orderly maritime law enforcement by the
United States Coast Guard.
187. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 25.
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